Next Talk: 'The Philosophy in Film' by Prof Gregory Currie, Tuesday 13 March 2018

Abstract:

 

The Philosophy in film

Cinema is often thought of as overwhelmingly a medium of entertainment. Yet its short history includes some of the greatest works of narrative art we have. Even modest productions, certainly designed to entertain, often present striking images that present views of the world we might call "philosophical". But what, exactly, does it take for something to count as philosophy, and how, exactly can film make a contribution to a philosophical project. I'll illustrate these issues by discussing some of the best (and worst) examples where film and philosophy collide.

Next Talk: A Royal Institute of Philosophy Public Lecture: 'Fake News! Language, Power and the Politics of Knowledge' by Dr Yasemin J. Erden, 13 February 2018

A Royal Institute of Philosophy Public Lecture                                        Abstract:                                                                                                                                          From Rumsfeld's 'Known unknowns' to Blair's Dossier, through to Trump's protestations of fake news, knowledge plays an important role in political narrative. Who knows what, and what can be known are key issues in those decisions which affect all our lives. Even when the claim to knowledge has been tenuous at best, there is an expectation of certainty -- we expect experts and politicians to know their stuff. In this talk we'll explore the space between knowledge as certainty, and knowledge as cultural in poststructural terms. We'll begin by examining the impact caused by philosophical doubt, uncertainty, and deconstruction, and end by asking whether philosophers have a role in reassuring others. For instance, by showing that there are some things we can know, and that these are the known knowns on which we can rely.

 

 

Next talk: 'The Idea of a Social Science: Winch, Weber and Wittgenstein' by Chris Bainbridge 09 January 2018

Abstract

People who study social phenomena, - the economy, politics, art, religion, family life, with their competing world views, have looked with envy at the natural sciences and sought to become more like them, with their hard, undisputed empirical facts and uninterrupted progress. But natural science isn’t quite as simple as that, and thinkers such as Peter Winch and Max Weber have said the fact that we’re participants in social life gives us a big advantage which we throw away if we just look at society from an outsider’s point of view as we do with natural phenomena. I will look at various concepts of what philosophy is to see what light they can throw epistemology’s key question – how do we know things?    

Next talk: 'Plato: Knowledge, Belief and Perception' a talk by Prof Sophie-Grace Chappell 14 November 2017

Abstract:   I'm going to talk about the Theaetetus AND the Meno. And about how they're two attempts on the same task: to understand the same range of questions about knowledge, belief, and the sources of those in our experience and elsewhere.   And about how much more sophisticated the Theaetetus is than the Meno... but how they're nonetheless clearly a pair. 

Next talk: 'Sources of Moral Knowledge' by Dr Alex Barber, Tuesday 10 October 2017

Philosophy

Abstract

“What evidence is there to support our moral beliefs? We assume that it is (usually) wrong to tell big lies, to steal, etc., but many philosophers, and many non-philosophers, have despaired at giving convincing grounds for such beliefs. It is hard to say much beyond ‘Well, that is just obvious!’ or ‘Don’t hold inconsistent moral beliefs’. This predicament contrasts with the rigorous evidence we have for our beliefs about the physical world (climate-change denialists notwithstanding). The contrast has tempted some philosophers to argue that moral theories can rest on the same kind of evidence as scientific ones, or even that scientific and moral beliefs form part of a single coherent and well-evidenced picture of the world. I will describe these efforts before highlighting a problem: their threat to undermine scientific enquiry itself, which need to be (in a specific sense) value free.”